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Maintaining the attention to bodily difference human and animal ontology has long been 
constructed on rigid physical characterizations seemingly untouched by culture. In “Reframing the 
Ethical Issues in Part-Human Animal Research,” Haber and Benham (2012) call into question most of 
the formal elements of essentialism that an earlier mode of thought took for granted. Two views on 
the nature of human and interspecies animal bodies are in contention here. The first offers an 
argument grounded in the essential developmental properties of human and animal material and 
biological systems such that giving life to “animals with human derived material,” exemplified by 
animal–human hybrids and chimeras, effaces physical distinctions between animal and human. 
Dualism is invoked as an interpretive aid, structuring thought and shaping understanding. Against 
nonhuman animals, human life, in all its stages and forms, uniquely requires some fundamental form 
of moral consideration. Because of this presumptive obligation, an “inexorable moral confusion” is 
an inevitable by-product of scientific change, since fixed constructions of animal and human bodies 
as unified and separate wholes are lost in any clear-cut sense (Robert and Baylis 2003). The 
uncanniness of animals with human parts is not, therefore, simply a product of the tension between 
the familiarity and foreignness of their appearance and nature. Rather, their very existence disrupts 
a priori assumptions about how the world is and ought to be ordered; belief systems that are central 
to understandings of what it means to be human and humanity's sense of distinctiveness. 
The second perspective recalibrates discussion about the nature of the animal and the human. 
Haber and Benham (2012) take aim at what they describe as the “naive developmental essentialism” 
around which previous resistance to human-animal interspecies research has been organized. 
Essentialist arguments, they say, do not so much problematize but hide the “true” ontological nature 
of human–animal hybrids. Arguing that developmental biology provides a more accurate account of 
the “inner truth” of animals with human-derived material, Haber and Benham (2012) find that 
normative “uncertainties” rather than “moral confusion” figures along the biomedical frontier, such 
that there is a complete subversion of the notion of unconnected categories, of clear-cut differences 
that are marked by impregnable and obvious boundaries. Rather than inexorable moral confusion, a 
narrative of uncertainty in human-to-nonhuman interspecies research, they argue, offers a more 
finely tuned and truthful, and therefore effective, oppositional discourse founded on good biological 
science. 
What animals in general and interspecies animals in particular share in both of the oppositional 
narratives just outlined is a normative conception of human biology and human life that 
presupposes an impetus toward the marginalization of nonhuman animal life. In terms of ethical 
application, Haber and Benham (2012) continue to frame their oppositional narrative in terms that 
keep an unequivocal distinction between human and animal in place. 
We differ from Haber and Benham (2012) in that where they see uncertainty or confusion, we see 
opportunity. Because interspecific animals materialize new forms of embodied relationship, the 
moral task that surround animals with human parts should not simply rest on how to categorize or 
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taxonomize new types of things. Rather, it could plausibly involve a deeper reading of how 
nonhuman life is typically situated in normative deliberations, and specifically how we should think 
about our ethical obligations to animals. 
Animals with human parts are not simply a source of ontological insecurity or uncertainty, nor are 
they a category or class of a certain kind of body, but a point of intellectual departure, a sign that a 
paradigmatic shift in bioethical thought is required. This does not mean that existing philosophical 
reflections on the moral status of animals have contributed nothing, or that we need to “rip it up 
and start again,” but rather, that a new approach to the ethical dimensions of our relationships with 
nonhuman animals is needed—one that helps us rethink the underlying ontological, epistemological, 
and ethical assumptions dominating existing bioethical analysis. Animals that are part of, but 
separate from, us create conditions of possibility for thinking otherwise: thinking differently beyond 
the boundaries of familiar narratives that construct the nonhuman animal as “Other,” as entities 
completely separate from us. 
Much of this work has already begun. Theoretical projects have been developed that interrogate 
paradigms of Western ethics inherited from humanist discourse and question whether these 
discourses are adequate for an understanding the relationship between animals and humans. 
Breaking down the binary categories of human–animal as a basis for normative deliberation, writers 
like Cora Diamond, Cary Wolfe, Martha Nussbaum, and others draw our gaze to fundamental 
continuities between human lives and the lives of other animals. For example, Diamond (1978) 
contends that animals are morally considerable based upon our intuitive perception of them as 
“fellow creatures” who share a like existence, “being in a certain boat … as our fellows in mortality in 
life on this earth” as “human beings” who are intrinsically valuable qua “human beings” (Diamond 
1978, 474). This nonbiological relationship and our recognition of our own vulnerability—that is 
shared between animal and human—is what freights our sense of moral consideration and 
generates our moral response to animals and their treatment (Diamond 2001, 121). Or it should. 
Like Diamond, Cary Wolfe (2010) focuses our attention on “personhood.” Appealing to epistemology 
and scientific evidence, he “disarticulates” the question of “persons” from species membership. Our 
relationship with them is grounded in what he describes as our “shared finitude”: Animals are first 
and foremost living beings and they share with us ontological vulnerability. Both human and 
nonhuman animals share the physical processes of aging, decline, and death (Wolfe 2010, 77, 139). 
This joint focus allows for a more serious consideration of nonhuman animals subjects founded on 
common vulnerabilities of the body and bodily suffering. 
Martha Nussbaum (2006), likewise, abandons assumptions of human exceptionalism to interrogate 
the consequentialist tropes that dominate current justifications for the continued utilization of 
nonhuman animals for human purposes. By taking a neo-Aristotelian approach that focuses on more 
than the moral significance of sentience she shows how “other” types of being (those that cannot 
fairly participate in a socio-moral contract founded on reciprocity and mutual benefit) are denied the 
possibility of justice, and therefore the capacity to flourish to their full potential. In this, Nussbaum 
shares with Diamond and Wolfe a concern for the continuities between human and nonhuman 
animals. Rather than biological identity or rationality, she posits dignity as one of the properties, or 
capabilities, we share with other species: our needs, capacity for pain, and the innate complexity and 
communitarian nature of being alive. 
These narratives mark a significant change in the way we think of nonhuman animals and of their 
moral status. Creatively rewriting ethical conversations about nonhuman animals, each narrative 
demands that we think “otherwise” about animals and our relationship with them. While 
acknowledging the limits of our knowing, these narratives invite us to transcend species limits and 
reimagine nonhuman animals beyond their position as “other”: to consider alternative ways of 
imagining, articulating, and valuing nonhuman animals and negotiating the animal–human 
relationship, mediated by recognition of a kind of kinship with animals beyond the species barrier. 
Such a commitment opens up new creative prospects of understanding that emphasize such human 
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social values as compassion (Wolfe 2010, 77), justice (Diamond 2001), sympathy (Butler 2004, 26), 
and reciprocity and obligation (Nussbaum 2006), worked out without recourse to old binaries of 
animal–human. 
Haber and Benham offer a starting point for the analysis of interspecies animal research that comes 
at the cost of ignoring the animal itself. But it will eventually be necessary to consider further the 
ethical implications of existence of these indeterminate creatures and to treat them, as all animals, 
as if they matter. These seemingly familiar yet foreign creatures can do much to further the 
development of our collective moral experience and lay the groundwork for new questions to be 
asked: How are we to deal with the animal “Other” when it is never, after all, completely “other”? 
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